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Introduction
The iron and steel arch bridge1 spanning the Mississippi River in downtown Saint
Louis just north of the Gateway Arch is commonly known as the Eads Bridge. This is not
the official name. The official name at the time of its opening on July 4, 1874, was the
“Illinois and St. Louis Bridge.”2 The fact that this bridge is not only still standing but
also providing daily passage over the Mississippi River for light rail and automobile
traffic is a testament to the ruggedness of its construction. The bridge’s existence and
permanence seem assured today. However, the inception and eventual construction of the
first bridge to cross the Mississippi River at Saint Louis was in doubt from the first
discussion of any bridge at Saint Louis. It was not until James B. Eads took control of all
aspects of the Saint Louis Bridge project in early 1867 that a bridge at Saint Louis
became a reality. Although the completed bridge is an iron and steel arch bridge, the
technology to build a suspension bridge spanning most, if not all, of the Mississippi River
existed at the time of the construction of the Eads arch bridge. Several proposals for
suspension bridges at Saint Louis were submitted from 1839 to 1865 but all were
rejected. Analysis by Eads of the components, and construction methods, of both types of
bridges led him to the conclusion that an arch bridge was the superior type bridge and the
type to build at Saint Louis.3
My thesis will examine the evolution of bridge-building technology, specifically
suspension bridge-building technology, research the decision making process Eads
employed in selecting an arch bridge design, and present conclusions that Eads reached
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that resulted in his belief that an arch bridge, built with the new technology of steel, was
superior to a suspension bridge.
The Civil War had brought the economic growth of Saint Louis to a near
standstill. Trade with the South was virtually eliminated. After hostilities ended the
southern economy slowly improved. Saint Louis, a longtime trader of the South, saw
their own economy expand as well. Cotton was a major component of the Saint Louis
economy in the 1850’s and after the war played an even greater role in the Saint Louis
economy. By 1874, the year the Eads Bridge opened; over 100,000 bales of cotton were
flowing through the Saint Louis economy. Due to new technology that was implemented
at Saint Louis to compress bales of cotton, rail transport from Saint Louis to eastern
destinations became cheaper than river transportation. The Wiggins Ferry monopoly on
freight crossing the Mississippi River at Saint Louis, coupled with increased economic
growth at Saint Louis, highlighted the need for a bridge at Saint Louis. In his book, Lion
of the Valley, James Neal Primm believed the economic gain from the cotton trade
demanded a bridge at Saint Louis when he stated; “The demands of the cotton trade
emphasized the need for a railroad bridge across the Mississippi.”4 The absence of a
bridge across the Mississippi River at Saint Louis might seem to have prevented any
business across the river, but early in the city’s history a system of ferries provided
adequate, if not ideal, river crossing.
Canals, steamboats, ferries, and railroads were all forms of transportation in use in
the decades leading up to the construction of the Eads Bridge. As the mode of
transportation progressed from canals to steamboats to railroads the need for new
infrastructure progressed as well. Stone and wood bridges spanning minor streams and
4
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rivers provided satisfactory crossing for pedestrians and horse drawn wagons. As the
need to cross wide and deep rivers, such as the Mississippi River at Saint Louis,
developed during the mid-nineteenth century, pedestrians, horse riders, and wagons
required the services of a ferry system. Difficult, time consuming, and often an expensive
monopoly in many cities, ferries did provide an important service. As railroads began
expanding and encountering rivers they also relied on the ferry systems.5 Before the
arrival of railroads, the principal demand for a bridge came from pedestrians, horse
riders, and wagons. In 1852 this changed in Saint Louis when the Pacific Railroad of
Missouri began operating out of the city. In 1854 the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad
reached Illinoistown, present day East Saint Louis. The Mississippi River created an
obstacle for railroads. It was an obstacle they could overcome, but not without great
difficulty. In the early history of the railroads arriving at the Mississippi River, goods
transported by the railroads were unloaded from the train, loaded onto a ferry, transported
across the river, unloaded from the ferry and eventually loaded back onto a train and
transported to their destination. This was an expensive, time consuming process. This
process was improved upon when railcars were ferried across the river and then attached
to a train for further transport. This was faster and cheaper than unloading and reloading
railcars but still not ideal because occasionally weather conditions kept the ferries from
operating and scheduling freight processing often resulted in delays. The expense, time,
and labor required to ferry train goods and train cars across the river pushed the need for
a bridge to a higher priority. Because of this a bridge to support rail traffic over the

5

George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution 1815-1860 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.,
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Mississippi River at Saint Louis was needed.6 Continuous rail traffic, via a bridge, was
needed to solve these issues and increase rail efficiency. These and other developments
caused Saint Louis leaders to reaffirm the need that Saint Louis build its first railroad
bridge.
Difficulty in crossing the Mississippi River at Saint Louis was not the only reason
a bridge was needed at Saint Louis. The city of Chicago was expanding its trade
westward in the early 1850’s and railroads were a major component in this expansion.
Rail traffic to and from Chicago was increasing much faster than at Saint Louis during
this time. Rail traffic for the western United States from Chicago was built via a northern
route, excluding Saint Louis. The east bound rail traffic to Chicago terminated at
Davenport, Iowa and the west bound traffic from Chicago terminated at Rock Island,
Illinois. The completion, in 1854, of terminals at these locations sparked the construction
of the first Rock Island Bridge.
Referencing a survey performed in 1837 by Robert E. Lee, chief engineer Henry
Farnam and consulting engineer John B. Jervis of The Railroad Bridge Company, tasked
with building the Rock Island Bridge, selected the site to place the Rock Island Bridge.
This site was the narrowest part of the river between Davenport and Rock Island. Even
so, it was a considerable distance at approximately 1,500 feet. The Mississippi River at
this location was shallow, rarely more than six feet deep during low water. The banks of
the river were high above the normal river level, greatly reducing damage from flooding.
The river bed at this location was all solid bedrock. These characteristics made

6

John H. White, Jr, Wet Britches and Muddy Boots: A History of Travel in Victorian America
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construction much easier than other possible locations south of this point, as the
Mississippi River deepened, and increased in flow speed, complicating pier construction.7
The Rock Island Bridge was a wooden truss bridge with masonry piers. These
piers lacked sufficient mass or anchoring even as they sat on bedrock. Twice in the
bridge’s history these piers would be moved by a force of nature. In 1856, while
preliminary planning work was being performed for a bridge at Saint Louis, a freight
train crossed the Rock Island Bridge for the first time, approximately 250 miles north of
Saint Louis. This was a bad omen for Saint Louis because with each passing day goods
that may have previously crossed the Mississippi River at Saint Louis on a ferry were
now bypassing Saint Louis. As a result, businesses using this new route no longer played
a role in the economy of Saint Louis. Even with its less than substantial construction the
Rock Island Bridge proved its worth the day it opened as freight trains transporting goods
flowed across it regularly. With each crossing the Rock Island Bridge diverted business
away from Saint Louis.
Even though the completion and use of the Rock Island Bridge reinforced the
need for a bridge at Saint Louis this was not the first time Saint Louis had considered a
bridge across the Mississippi River. The first proposal, in 1839, was submitted by Charles
Ellet, Jr. for the construction of a pedestrian and wagon suspension bridge with a main
span of 1,200 feet and 900 feet side spans. Ellet was an engineer who, through lectures on
bridge building and hands-on experience, became a bridge designer and builder. Ellet’s
suspension bridge proposal scared Saint Louis city officials to the point of rejecting his
design. Saint Louis city officials allowed Ellet to prepare and distribute documentation

7
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with specifications for his bridge before they decided that a bridge of the size Ellet was
proposing was unrealistic. Although the mayor of Saint Louis stated they could not
justify spending the amount of money Ellet estimated the bridge would cost, this may
have been an excuse as many city officials thought Ellet’s plan was outrageous, unsafe,
and they sent him on his way as fast as they could. Ellet’s experience and overseas bridge
building education were of no value to his proposal being accepted.8
Although Ellet’s design was revolutionary, a suspension bridge was a viable
option for the first bridge to span the Mississippi River at Saint Louis. In 1839, this 1,200
foot main span would have been far ahead of its time. It would have been nearly 330 feet
longer than the longest suspension span in use. It would have exceeded the length of the
main span of the Wheeling Suspension Bridge, built in 1849, by almost 200 feet and the
main span of the Roebling Suspension Bridge, built in 1866, by almost 150 feet. Even
though the rejection of Ellet and his plan was the correct action taken, a suspension
bridge at Saint Louis remained as a possible solution for bridging the Mississippi River.9

8

David B. Steinman and Sara Ruth Watson, Bridges and their Builders (New York: Dover Publications
Inc., 1941), 175.
9
Gene D. Lewis, Charles Ellet Jr. The Engineer as Individualist 1810-1862 (Urbana, IL: University of
Illinois Press, 1968), 119.
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Chapter 1
The Evolution of the Suspension Bridge
The origin of the suspension bridge cannot be definitively determined. However,
evidence shows they were used as a necessity to routinely traverse a deep cut in the earth,
or a body of water too deep or dangerous to cross by fording. From these basic but
important needs, magnificent structures such as the Brooklyn Bridge owe their existence.
Progressing from the initial suspension bridge, probably made of some type of
vegetation, to a modern suspension bridge like the Brooklyn Bridge, required many years
of development, immense manpower, large financial input, loss of life, and much trial
and error. The three countries that provided the majority of these resources, and reaped
the most benefits were the United States, Great Britain, and France. Other countries
contributed resources to furthering the science of the modern suspension bridge; however
the aforementioned countries were the key developers.10
Judge James Finley, of the United States, is widely recognized, by academics and
engineers, as the originator of the modern suspension bridge. Although the British and
French were well versed in engineering, Finley developed the first modern suspension
bridge in Pennsylvania. To be considered a modern suspension bridge two parameters had
to be met. The decking of the bridge needed to be a flat surface and not follow the curve
of the suspension cables, and the bridge needed to be built sturdily enough so that no
discernable movement of the bridge decking or bridge took place while being crossed.
Finley was able to accomplish these two requirements in Pennsylvania in 1801 and the
first modern suspension bridge was born. A diagram of the chain bridge built in 1808
10

G. F. Fordham, “On the Theory of Suspension Bridges with some account of their early history,” The
Irish Penny Journal, Vol. 1, No. 34 (Feb. 20, 1841): 267-268.
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over the Schuylkill River, was very similar to the first modern suspension bridge,
Finley’s Jacob Creek Bridge. The diagram portrayed an unmistakable likeness to
suspension bridges that were built over the next one hundred years.11 Although the Jacob
Creek Bridge was a small bridge with a span of seventy feet, according to historians
Kemp and Fluty in their book, The Wheeling Suspension Bridge, it contained all the
“…elements of the modern suspension bridge.”12
The elements of a modern suspension bridge consisted of a main supporting iron
chain, bar chain or cable, towers to support these components and anchorages to which
the main support element was anchored, a level deck, and some type of stiffening
assembly for the deck. The anchorages were usually very large man-made masonry
structures but could also be naturally occurring rock that was used as an anchorage. The
portion of the supporting element that extended from the towers to the anchorages was
known as the backstay. A stiffening truss under the deck helped keep the deck from
twisting and undulating. Suspenders from the main supporting element supported the
level deck.13
Many ideas for improvements were proposed in the early years of suspension
bridge development. One of those ideas came from John Templeman, an associate of
Finley’s, who suggested, among other materials “…wire built up in parallel strands”14 as
the main supports in an 1810 patent. This might be the earliest reference to using wire

11

Emory L. Kemp and Beverly B. Fluty, The Wheeling Suspension Bridge: A Pictorial Heritage
(Charleston, WV: Pictorial Histories Publishing Co., 1999), 5; H.J. Hopkins, A Span of Bridges: An
Illustrated History (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 177; Tadaki Kawada, History of the Modern
Suspension Bridge Solving the Dilemna between Economy and Stiffness. Translated by Harukazu Ohashi.
Edited by Richard Scott. (Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, 2010), 18; James Finley, “A
Description of the Patent Chain Bridge,’ The Port Folio, 3no6 (1810), 441-453.
12
Kemp and Fluty, The Wheeling Suspension Bridge, 5; Appendix B.
13
Kemp and Fluty, The Wheeling Suspension Bridge, 5; Appendix A.
14
Kemp and Fluty, The Wheeling Suspension Bridge, 5.
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instead of heavy iron chain, and the other components of an early chain suspension
bridge. One improvement that Finley was aware of was the need for building stiffness
into his bridges, a concept that became more important as wind stress came into play.
Due to Finley’s suspension bridge design and construction, western society began to
accept suspension bridges as permanent structures. The view of the suspension bridge as
an unsafe device used by uneducated people began to fade. With the erection of each new
suspension bridge, an improved reputation as a safe mode of crossing an obstacle was
being garnered by these bridges.15
From his initial suspension bridge in 1801, until 1810, Finley enjoyed a very
successful career as a bridge builder. There were many suspension bridges built using
Finley’s patents and although they were of varying lengths the trend was towards longer
spans. When Finley’s success in the development of suspension bridges reached Britain,
in the very early nineteenth century, engineers combined this information with their
engineering knowledge and began building advanced suspension bridges. The British
expanded on Finley’s work with suspension bridges by adding improvements such as the
use of eye bar, instead of chain, to the bridges they built.16
In 1821, the French visited Britain to study their suspension bridges and shortly
thereafter embarked on their own suspension bridge building era. As the French adopted
the suspension bridge in their country they replaced the eye bar of the British design with
wire cable and built their first wire suspension bridge in 1823. This bridge, the Pont
Saint-Antoine, was built in Geneva, Switzerland in 1823 by Guillaume-Henri Dufour, a
15

David McCullough, The Great Bridge: The Epic Story of the Building of the Brooklyn Bridge (New
York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972), 74.
16
Kawada, History of the Modern Suspension Bridge, 19; E. L. Kemp. “Links in a chain The development
of suspension bridges 1801-70,” The Structural Engineer, Volume 57A, no.8 (1979): 257-258; Appendix
H.
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Swiss Army technical officer, and Marc Seguin, a French engineer. Seguin took the lead
on building suspension bridges in France from Claude L.M. Navier. Navier, a French
scholar, had researched British suspension bridges, produced a report on them for the
French government, and promoted their development in France. Navier’s work helped
produce a large increase in suspension bridge building in France, which resulted in the
construction of more than 200 suspension bridges between 1830 and 1850.17
Even as the British and French continued their research and improvements on
suspension bridges, Finley continued to build. Although Finley designed and built many
bridges before his death in 1828, it was Charles Ellet, Jr. who improved on Finley’s
design and secured his own legacy with the construction of the Wheeling Suspension
Bridge.
Ellet was born in 1810, years after Finley developed the components of the
modern suspension bridge. Ellet left home in his late teens to find the technical work that
suited him more than the work involved in running a family farm. Ellet found a position
with the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal in 1828 and quickly advanced to assistant engineer
in 1829. Desiring more than this job could give him, he quit and traveled to France to
expand his engineering expertise. He attended several lectures given by leading French
engineers, including Navier. Ellet also toured various areas of Europe before returning to
the United States in 1832. His expertise in bridge design and building was mostly due to
experience, with little formal bridge engineering education. He gained most of his

17

Kawada, History of the Modern Suspension Bridge, 48-53; Appendix I.
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education from self-study: time spent touring overseas attending lectures in France, and
meeting prominent French engineers involved in bridge construction.18
Once back in the United States, Ellet categorized the suspension bridge work of
Finley and others as primitive. The main reason for this was because they were building
bridges with chain or bar chain and not using the new technology of drawn wire to build
suspension cables of great strength. Ellet advocated wire suspension bridges as the
French had developed them rather than bars or rods for chains that the British had used
for their suspension bridges. It is interesting to note that Ellet derided the work of Finley
and others as primitive when Finley initially advocated a stiffening truss, and the first
patent for wire use in a suspension bridge occurred in the United States in 1810. Ellet, to
his detriment, may have downplayed the use of a stiffening truss. He tendered a design
for a suspension bridge over the Potomac River shortly after his return from Europe but
did not receive the contract for this bridge. Ellet did not let this rejection deter him. He
was determined to build long-span suspension bridges using the newer technology of
wire cables.19
Eventually Ellet was successful in building a wire suspension bridge. The
Schuylkill River Bridge, built by Ellet in 1842 as the first wire suspension bridge in
America, cemented his reputation as a master bridge builder. Partially due to his success
with the Schuylkill River Bridge, he was selected, in 1847 by the board of directors of the
company formed to bridge the Ohio River at Wheeling, Virginia, to build a bridge across
the Ohio River at Wheeling. This suspension bridge was the longest span in the world at

18

Lewis, Charles Ellet Jr. The Engineer as Individualist 1810-1862, 7-26; Kemp and Fluty, The Wheeling
Suspension Bridge, 7.
19
Emory Kemp, “Iron, Engineers, and the Wheeling Suspension Bridge,” Upper Ohio Valley Historical
Review 11 (Spring-Summer 1982): 2-11; Kemp and Fluty, The Wheeling Suspension Bridge, 7.
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the time of its construction. Ellet’s reputation as a master bridge builder was questioned
after this bridge, the Wheeling Suspension Bridge, collapsed in 1854. The collapse
occurred during high winds which caused the bridge to fail because it was not built with
sufficient stiffness. It is very likely this collapse could have been avoided if Ellet had
been more receptive to unsolicited offers of help. When John A. Roebling, a young civil
engineer with an interest in bridge building, attempted to establish himself in the
suspension bridge building business, he wrote to Ellet in early 1840 offering his talents to
work on the Schuylkill River Bridge. Roebling later contacted Ellet concerning this
bridge contract but did not receive a positive response from Ellet. This was undoubtedly
an eventful twist of fate for both Ellet and Roebling, although more so for Ellet. Had he
encouraged Roebling and hired him to work on the Schuylkill River Bridge, it is possible
that Ellet’s reputation as a suspension bridge builder would have no blemishes on it. As
often happens when new workers are added to a company, they bring different ideas and
experiences with them. Occasionally these workers are instrumental in moving
companies in different and better directions. Roebling would most likely have steered
Ellet to the need for stiffened suspension bridges and avoided the failure of the Wheeling
Suspension Bridge.20
In 1837, which was very early in his bridge building career, Ellet described the
function of a suspension bridge:
The suspension bridge enables a light and weak structure to yield
repeatedly to a heavy body passing over it, to acquire a new state of
20

David B. Steinman, The Builders of the Bridge (New York: Arno Press, 1972), 170-171; Emory L.
Kemp, Charles Ellet, Jr. and the Wheeling Suspension Bridge, in Proceedings of an International
Conference on Historic Bridges to Celebrate the 150th Anniversary of the Wheeling Suspension Bridge
October 21-23, 1999 Wheeling West Virginia, ed. Emory L. Kemp (Morgantown, WV: West Virginia
University Press, 1999), 18.
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equilibrium, and return to its former situation as soon as the disturbing
force is withdrawn.21
This description gives the impression that Ellet did not completely understand the
requirements of a suspension bridge. Although it is true that a suspension bridge will
yield somewhat to a heavy body passing over it, a light and weak suspension bridge was
not the correct design for a long lasting suspension bridge. The Wheeling Suspension
Bridge collapsed in 1854, seventeen years after Ellet first described how a suspension
bridge handled moving loads. Although it was wind that caused the collapse of the
Wheeling Suspension Bridge, not a moving load, his disregard for stiffening components
played a major role in its collapse. After the collapse of the Wheeling Suspension Bridge
Ellet attempted to continue his bridge building activities but was not successful in
acquiring any contracts. Apparently Ellet, even though a gifted engineer, never
completely understood the need for incorporating stiffness into his suspension bridges.22
John A. Roebling graduated from the Royal Polytechnic Institute in Berlin in
1826 with the degree of Civil Engineer. He was now ready to conquer the world; at least
the bridge building world. In Germany his options were very limited. Because of the
government hierarchy the avenue most open to him was as an employee of the Prussian
Government building roads and small bridges. At the end of his three year apprenticeship
he felt he needed to break away from this position or possibly remain locked into a stable,
but depressing, government job.23

21

House Report No. 135, 24th Cong., 2d Sess. (1837), 21-25 quoted in Gene D. Lewis, Charles Ellet Jr.
The Engineer as Individualist 1810-1862 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1968), 27.
22
John A. Roebling, Final Report of John A. Roebling, Civil Engineer, to the Presidents and Directors of
the Niagara Falls Suspension and Niagara Falls International Bridge Companies (Rochester, N.Y.: Steam
Press of Lee, Mann, and CO., Daily American, 1855), 8.
23
Steinman, The Builders of the Bridge , 10-17.
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Roebling knew he must go to America where he would have more opportunities
for a fulfilling career and life. He planned and developed an agricultural community in
rural Pennsylvania for immigrants from Germany. From 1831 to 1837, Roebling toiled to
make this venture a success. In 1837, Roebling decided that farming was not for him and
struck out on a new path; a path of engineering and invention. His inventions produced
many patents. In addition to his inventing, Roebling found work on the Sandy and Beaver
Canal as an engineering aide. At the end of this canal work Roebling found a new
position as a surveyor for the railroads. Roebling’s intelligence and engineering
capabilities kept him employed from the time he left his agricultural settlement. Realizing
he needed bridge building experience to attract attention from governments or private
enterprises seeking bridge building skills, he searched for a position as an assistant or
apprentice on a bridge building project. He needed a connection to advance his career.
This was how Ellet entered Roebling’s life.24
As a young man Roebling followed Ellet’s accomplishments. Roebling wrote to
him to obtain his review, and approval, of his plan to use wire cables to replace the hemp
rope used by the Allegheny Portage Railroad for hauling railroad cars up and down
mountains. Roebling felt a positive opinion of his plan, from Ellet, to use wire cables
would help sway the Pennsylvania Board of Public Works to approve his plan. One
important piece of advice that Ellet gave, and Roebling used, was not to have a splice in
his cable but to make it of one long continuous piece. Roebling constructed the first wire
cable in America after obtaining approval of his plan from the Pennsylvania Board of
Public Works. The development of the wire cable by Roebling was a major component in
the successful construction of permanent suspension bridges. Roebling and Ellet
24

Steinman, The Builders of the Bridge, 42-55.
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conversed many times concerning bridge building ideas before they became alienated
over the building of the suspension bridge over the Schuylkill River. Roebling looked to
Ellet as an undeclared mentor before their rift began.25
On the journey to the safe development of permanent suspension bridges many
suspension bridges had failures and collapses, often just a few years after construction
was completed, and often with loss of life. A major component of these failures was the
lack of understanding of the effect of wind on suspension bridges. Wind often caused
much oscillation and undulating motion of suspension bridges that were not heavy
enough or braced correctly for controlling the wind. Many engineers did not understand
this issue, and therefore did not realize the need to compensate for wind. The suspension
bridges that were not affected by wind were probably engineered more by chance than by
deliberate engineering to withstand wind oscillation. The eventual understanding of wind
dynamics in the mid-twentieth century on suspension bridges was a technological
breakthrough that eventually made suspension bridges much safer.26
Suspension bridge collapses were taking place before, and up to the time, a bridge
across the Mississippi River at Saint Louis was being discussed. These collapses did not
completely stop suspension bridge construction. A railway and road bridge was proposed
over the Niagara River in 1845 by Charles B. Stuart and William Hamilton Merritt, an
engineer and entrepreneur respectively. Because of the volatility of the Niagara River,
and frequency of ice buildup in winter, no piers or falseworks could be used to build a
bridge over the river. This led Stuart and Merritt to believe only a suspension bridge
would work in this location. The only precedent for a railway suspension bridge was a

25
26

Lewis, Charles Ellet Jr. The Engineer as Individualist 1810-1862, 74-75.
Kawada, History of the Modern Suspension Bridge, 36-41.
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suspension bridge built for the Stockton and Darlington Railway in England in 1830.
Opened over the River Tees on January 1, 1831, for railway traffic, this bridge near
Stockton proved that deflection in a suspension bridge was a danger during the first trial
of the bridge. This bridge was looked upon to provide great service to the community via
railway traffic but failed in its first test. The bridge was not able to support a load less
than the original weight design specification without considerable deformation. An initial
test with a less than maximum number of rail cars caused a peak to form in the track
ahead of the rail cars. Once half of the rail cars surmounted this peak a coupling failure
occurred, due to the great flexibility of the bridge, sending half the cars one way and half
the other way. Once the problem was determined, the bridge was strengthened but
remained a suspension bridge. After this correction, “The bridge then received an
indefinite number of wagons.”27 This was in 1831, eighteen years before the opening of
the Wheeling Suspension Bridge. Ellet had arrived in France on June 7, 1830,
approximately six months before the railway suspension bridge over the River Tees was
tested, and stayed in Europe until returning to the United States in 1832. How Ellet could
have missed the results of this test of the first railway suspension bridge in the world is
not known. One of the engineers that Ellet held in high regard, Claude L.M. Navier, spent
time in Britain studying the state of suspension bridge building and must have had
contacts in Britain familiar with this test. Is it possible he was also unaware of this testing
of the world’s first railway suspension bridge? This does not seem likely. The results of
this test should have alerted Navier, and Ellet, to the need for stiffness in suspension
bridges, even if they were not intended to carry rail traffic. At the very least Ellet should
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have considered this before embarking on his suspension bridge building career. It would
appear he knew nothing of this test or chose to ignore the test results. It is understandable
that wind-induced loads causing problems were little understood in the early days of
suspension bridge building, however, the advantage of having a flexible suspension
bridge that Ellet felt: “. . .would deflect under live loads to assume a more efficient
configuration as loads moved across the bridge” was put to rest with the first railway
suspension bridge. Although the suspension bridge for the Stockton and Darlington
railway was strengthened and made suitable for rail traffic, increased traffic caused the
bridge to become a choking point on the railway. In 1844 it was replaced by a much
sturdier iron girder bridge. The weight and action of a locomotive and train cars was not
always required to cause a suspension bridge to experience movement or collapse. It was
often poor construction, wind, and occasionally a mass of people.28
Early in the history of suspension bridges the Samuel Brown Broughton Chain
Pier failed, twice, once in 1833 and again in 1836 after being rebuilt. Both failures were
caused by violent storms. The Menai Straits Bridge also suffered damage from high
winds during stormy conditions. Initially damaged in 1826, it was rebuilt, suffered
damage again in 1836 and then again in 1839. During load testing by marching troops on
April 16, 1850, the bridge at Angers, France, collapsed. This collapse shook the
confidence of the French considerably and they suspended the construction of suspension
bridges for the rest of the nineteenth century.29
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Early suspension bridges were designed and built to be strong. Their engineers
knew they had to support the weight of people, wagons, horses, trains and any other
object that needed to cross their bridge. These bridges were not built with adequate
stiffness to resist movement caused when the bridge was crossed, or when wind caused
them to move uncontrollably. One of the major concerns of the general public concerning
suspension bridges was that they appeared to collapse for no apparent reason. There were
other types of bridges that collapsed but suspension bridges were acquiring the reputation
of being the bridge type that the public, and some engineers, believed was unsafe.
Initially feared as unsafe, suspension bridges had gained public acceptance as safe with
the bridges built by Finley in the early nineteenth century. As more suspension bridges
were built and collapsed, their reputation as a safe structure declined among all, not just
the public. There were indeed valid reasons for the collapses that occurred but the public
and many engineers often did not know the reasons. Once it was determined that many of
the collapsing bridges were not designed and built with the appropriate amount of
stiffness even the layperson could understand the reason for collapse. They might not be
able to comprehend the physics behind the bridge oscillations from moving loads or wind
dynamics, but they could understand that great movement in a suspension bridge was not
safe. The layperson had probably experienced some unstable structure in his or her
lifetime, whether from a stairway, footbridge, or other everyday item and realized that
left uncorrected this structure would eventually fail. It took only a simple thought, even in
an uneducated mind, that movement in a structure as substantial as a suspension bridge
was not a desirable event.30
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Even as the requirements for suspension bridges to be built with a certain amount
of stiffness began to be understood, many engineers still did not completely comprehend
this concept. One engineer that did understand the need for stiffness in suspension
bridges was John A. Roebling. Roebling understood the dangers of uncontrolled and
unrestricted movement in suspension bridges. Because of this Roebling was able to
design the Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge, and later the Brooklyn Bridge, with
sufficient stiffness to dampen and control any oscillation or movement in his bridges.
This was not an experiment; Roebling had experience with stiffening suspension bridges
for quite some time before construction began on the Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge.
Many believed that Roebling added stays and other improvements to the
Wheeling Suspension Bridge when it suffered extensive damage in a violent storm in
1854. Among the repairs made were improvements to control the movements of the
Wheeling Suspension Bridge from sources such as wind and moving loads. These
improvements included adding a stiffening truss, stay cables, and a single suspension
cable on each side of the bridge composed of numerous smaller wires compressed into
one single round cable, and wrapped with a single wire to retard corrosion. These cables
replaced Ellet’s original six horizontally aligned French style cables. To be a successful
and permanent suspension bridge two features were required; stiffness and economy.
Wire cable contributed to both of these features. By combining wire into cables, Roebling
was able to construct cables that were stronger and lighter than comparable chain and bar
components. Although there is some confusion and disagreement as to whether Ellet or
Roebling actually performed the repairs to the Wheeling Suspension Bridge, there is no
disagreement that the repairs and improvements had been performed in typical Roebling
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design and style. At the very least, it appeared Roebling had major input into the
repairs.31
Around the time Saint Louis city leaders were deciding they needed a railroad
bridge, not just a bridge, across the Mississippi River for the first time, Roebling was
opening his Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge to the public. The year was 1855, thirteen
years before construction began on the Eads Bridge. Among the many engineers who said
a suspension bridge was a dangerous structure in and of itself, but even more so when
designed as a railroad suspension bridge, stood one man who knew better; John A
Roebling. Roebling was the foremost supporter of suspension bridges being built to carry
railroads. There were other engineers in the United States, as well as foreign countries,
who believed suspension bridges could be safely used by railroads. These engineers did
not have the understanding of the construction required to make a suspension bridge
sturdy enough to safely carry railroad traffic. The one engineer with this knowledge was
Roebling.
To build the Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge, Roebling first had to become the
chief engineer of the bridge. This was not easy to do since Ellet was already the chief
engineer. Due to some questionable activities concerning Ellet’s use of money received
from events surrounding the bridge, he was relieved of his duties. Therefore a new chief
engineer was needed for the construction. It took the bridge companies over three years
to select a new chief engineer. They picked Roebling, an engineer who had developed
wire cable in the United States, built four suspension aqueducts, and had a much better
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understanding of the need for suspension bridges built with the correct amount of
stiffness than any engineer on earth. Roebling made the most of this opportunity.
The completion of his first suspension aqueduct in Pennsylvania in 1845 put
Roebling on track to gain the knowledge he needed to build the Niagara Falls Suspension
Bridge. Although the aqueduct consisted of seven spans that were each only
approximately 162 feet long, they were incredibly strong. This length was much less than
future suspension bridges Roebling created, but the experience of creating a suspension
aqueduct that carried 2,000 tons of water gave Roebling the knowledge to build stiff
suspension bridges. This 2,000 tons of water statement does not carry much weight
initially. When analyzed it is determined 2,000 tons of water equates to 4,000,000
pounds. The largest steam locomotive ever built in the United States, in 1941, with tender
attached, weighed just over 1,200,000 pounds. This was just thirty percent of what
Roebling’s aqueduct could carry. These numbers alone proved that Roebling’s aqueduct
construction method more than qualified him to build the Niagara Falls Suspension
Bridge. The vast weight of water carried by the aqueduct proved that Roebling’s design
using stiffening components and wire cable was sound. He used skills and techniques
learned at the aqueduct in the construction of the Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge.32
In addition to using wire cable in the construction of his suspension aqueduct,
Roebling also incorporated a unique technique to anchor the cables. In his book The
Great Bridge: The Epic Story of the Building of the Brooklyn Bridge, David McCullough
stated that Roebling attached cables “. . . to great chains of iron eyebars embedded in
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masonry, a plan not used in any prior suspension bridge and the one he would use on
every bridge he built thereafter.”33
Because of his knowledge Roebling was the ideal engineer to design and build the
Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge. When Roebling was selected to lead the construction of
this bridge engineers all over the world were skeptical of its possibility of success.
According to Takada Kawada in his book History of the Modern Suspension Bridge, one
of these engineers was “Robert Stephenson the leading engineer of British railroads at
that time . . . .” Stephenson believed that suspension bridges did not possess adequate
stiffness for running trains over them and he was probably correct until Roebling came
along. Upon hearing of Roebling’s appointment as chief engineer, Stephenson sent
Roebling a letter suggesting he rethink his plan to build the Niagara Falls Suspension
Bridge. In his letter Stephenson stated “If your bridge succeeds then mine have been
magnificent blunders.”34
Based upon his experience and abilities, it is doubtful Roebling seriously
considered Stephenson’s suggestion and statement. Roebling forged ahead and completed
the bridge four years after construction began. On March 16, 1855, Roebling proved that
a railway suspension bridge was feasible when a full size train crossed the Niagara Falls
Suspension Bridge.35 This train was specifically designed to be as heavy as possible.
Twenty double-loaded cars were pushed across the bridge by a locomotive weighing
twenty-eight tons. Roebling reported that no vibrations were felt from the bridge during
this test. After this successful test trains began using the bridge within a few days, and
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shortly afterwards trains were crossing about one every hour. Roebling wrote to his
family that “No one is afraid to cross. . . .”36 In his May 1, 1855 report to the bridge
owners he stated that:
The trains of the New York Central, and of the Great Western Rail Road
in Canada, have been crossing regularly since the 18th of March, averaging
over 30 trips per day.37
It was not only Roebling singing the praises of his bridge. Alfred Pairpoint, an
Englishman documenting his travels in the United States and Canada, was very interested
in the bridge. Pairpoint observed heavily loaded trains crossing the bridge and was
impressed at the strength of the bridge. From his perspective, Pairpoint believed that a
suspension bridge at this location was the only bridge type that would have been
successful.38
Five years after the bridge opening Roebling presented a report, on August 1,
1860, to the presidents and directors of the Niagara Falls Suspension and Niagara Falls
International Bridge Companies. This report, on the condition of the Niagara Falls
Suspension Bridge, detailed the results of Roebling’s inspection of this bridge. Roebling
spent three days in July inspecting his bridge and then reported his findings. The main
issue Roebling found that needed to be addressed appeared to be “. . . rapid wear of the
rails, many of which require renewal.” Roebling attributed this rapid wear to the great
amount of rail traffic crossing the bridge in a twenty-four hour time frame. He stated the
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average number of trains crossing the bridge each day to be approximately forty-five.
Using instruments to test the deflection of the bridge, Roebling recorded measurements
for five trains crossing the bridge in 1860 to compare with his measurements when the
bridge was new in 1855. Among these five trains crossing the bridge was “A train,
composed of the engine ‘Essex,’ and tender, of 35 tons weight, drawing 10 empty cars. . .
.” After gathering his measurements, Roebling found that the amount of deflection for a
train crossing the bridge in 1860 was the same as in 1855. Another area that Roebling
addressed was the slow speed that trains must adhere to when crossing the bridge.
Opponents of suspension bridges as railway bridges pointed to this low speed as an
inherent weakness of railway suspension bridges. Roebling addressed this by stating that
the reason for the slow speed over the bridge was for safety. He also made it clear that, in
this case at least, a higher speed does nothing for passengers on a train crossing this
bridge. By keeping passenger trains to less than five miles per hour three distinct steps
were achieved: The bridge is a connection between two termini of relatively short
distance, passengers will be able to enjoy the scenery when the bridge is crossed at a
slower speed, and the bridge was designed with safety features that will be most effective
when traversed at a slow speed. Should freight trains need to cross the bridge at a high
rate of speed in the future, Roebling confidently assured the presidents and directors that
modifications could be made that would allow for faster trains crossing. For an additional
$20,000 he could make the bridge safe for high speed freight trains. This reinforcement
of the bridge would eliminate any possible damage to the bridge from high speed freight
trains.39
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Roebling also reported that although he inspected other areas of his bridge, the
cables supporting the bridge were the most important feature. He produced a lengthy
explanation of how iron exposed to vibration under tension, or to bending and twisting,
will eventually undergo an internal change in its makeup. Bridges built with no regard for
stiffness are exposed to vibration at all times from traffic as well as wind loading. This
vibration, left unchecked, shortens the life of bridge components. This internal change
can be catastrophic in a suspension bridge as it could cause enough cables to fail to no
longer support the bridge. To eliminate this possibility Roebling built his bridges with
enough stiffness to eliminate, or reduce to a negligible value, any vibration or torsion that
could be transferred to the iron cables. Roebling ended his report with an assurance that
the cables of the Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge “. . . may safely be trusted for a long
series of years.”40
Roebling felt that the many rivers and gorges in the United States could only be
practically bridged by suspension bridges. He felt the tubular, arch, and truss type bridges
were not feasible for these wide and deep spans. Of course, the suspension bridge was the
specialty of Roebling, so it was only natural that he leaned toward suspension bridges and
away from any other types. At about the same time he was building the Niagara Falls
Suspension Bridge, Roebling had started construction of a more advanced railway
suspension bridge to span the Kentucky River for the Lexington and Danville Railroad.
This suspension bridge was to have a single span of 1,224 feet at a height of over 300 feet
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above the Kentucky River. After construction of the stone towers needed to carry the
suspension cables was completed the Financial Panic of 1857 caused the project to come
to a halt, as one of the worst economic crises in United States history began. After the
Financial Panic of 1857 and the Civil War passed, work began again on a bridge to span
the Kentucky River. The original plans for a suspension bridge were scrapped and a
cantilever bridge was built in its place. Although Roebling was not able to finish the
construction of this suspension bridge, he was sure that with increased demand for
transportation much longer railroad suspension bridges would be built: “We may then see
Railway Bridges suspended of 2000 feet span, which will admit of the passage of trains at
the highest speed.”41
With a span of 825 feet, the Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge was nearly twice as
long as any railroad suspension bridge built previously. Roebling knew that this bridge
required a very stiff and stable construction. To acquire this stiffness he built the nonrailway deck eighteen feet below the railway deck. He connected the two decks by means
of stiffening trusses. To provide the required stiffness these trusses were built of wooden
posts and connected with diagonal iron rods. The stiffness provided by this construction
allowed trains to use the bridge with complete safety. Based on his experiences with
other structures he used a unique arrangement of these components to negate the
destructive powers of storms, trains, and all other forces acting upon his bridge in a
manner that could cause it to fail. It was because of the large number of bridge failures,
and the larger number of flimsy bridges currently in use that could fail, that Roebling
advocated for engineers to embrace his techniques. Roebling felt that by incorporating his
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designs and construction methods, other engineers, and the public, would benefit from
the advancements in safety these features provided. Roebling stated “The Niagara Bridge
possesses all the stiffness that is wanted, and much more than is actually needed for the
safe passage of trains.” With this statement Roebling was telling the entire world that
suspension bridges, and especially railway suspension bridges, could be made safe if
engineers built the correct amount of stiffness into them. Many engineers did not heed his
advice. As late as the 1940’s, suspension bridges such as the Tacoma Narrows Bridge,
which collapsed in high wind, were being built without regard for what Roebling knew in
the mid-nineteenth century.42
By building stiffness into his bridges Roebling had solved a dilemma that had
confounded suspension bridge builders for decades. With the successful completion, and
use, of the Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge Roebling established the suspension bridge
as the primary safe means of spanning long distances. The bridge was safe for rail traffic
when it opened, and remained safe for rail traffic throughout its forty-one year life. Over
the course of these forty-one years improvements were made to the bridge to keep it safe.
Components made of steel or iron replaced original components made of wood and stone.
In 1896, locomotives and the cars they pulled had increased in weight so much that
continued use of the Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge was unsafe and it was replaced.
Roebling proved, in 1855, that safe railroad suspension bridges could be built and, if
maintained properly, serve safely for many years. Based on the success of the Niagara
Falls Suspension bridge, there does not appear to have been a valid reason to have
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eliminated a suspension bridge as a choice for the bridge to span the Mississippi River at
Saint Louis.43
Washington Roebling, son of John A. Roebling, was well on his way to becoming
accomplished in the construction of suspension bridges when he completed his thesis at
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. His thesis, Design for a Suspension Aqueduct, was
developed to transport water from the Poestenkill Creek into Troy, NY. The detail of
Roebling’s thesis proved that as early as 1857 Washington Roebling understood the
physics required to build a suspension bridge capable of carrying heavy and dynamic
loads. This thesis for a suspension aqueduct could easily have been used as a point of
reference in the construction of a railway suspension bridge.44
The bulk of the young Roebling’s knowledge must have come via his formal
education, but then again undoubtedly his father conveyed a great base of suspension
bridge knowledge to his son. An article in an 1869 issue of Engineering supported this
assertion when referring to the death of John Roebling it stated: “. . . they are fortunate in
that he has left behind him a son possessing the genius of his father, as well as the
benefits of his great experience.”45
As a bridge building team, John and Washington Roebling were careful to use
technologies and materials that had been proven to be safe and effective. It was not that
they were not innovative, because they were. However, they wanted to be sure that
proven concepts went into the bridges they built. Just as the aqueducts provided proven
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techniques and experiences that were used in the Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge, this
same process of using proven concepts from the Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge, and
the Roebling Suspension Bridge, was carried forward in the design and construction of
the Brooklyn Bridge. If a suspension bridge design by John Roebling had been selected
for bridging the Mississippi River at Saint Louis, his death would not have caused much,
if any, disruption as his son Washington was capable of building any suspension bridge
John Roebling had designed.46
Many years passed after the rejection of Ellet’s plan in 1839 before another
proposal to span the Mississippi River at Saint Louis was submitted. Saint Louis city
resident Josiah Dent submitted plans for a suspension bridge in 1855. Dent obtained
charters from Missouri and Illinois that enabled him to form a company to build a bridge
at Saint Louis. The railroads had made much progress in laying track in the previous
fifteen years and Dent planned to build a railroad suspension bridge over the Mississippi
River to accommodate them. The fact that only one railroad entered the city of Saint
Louis did not deter Dent, as railroads being built from the east would need to cross the
Mississippi River. Dent’s plans called for a single span suspension bridge of 1,500 feet,
ninety feet above high water to eliminate any steamboat interests claiming obstruction
with their chimneys. This was definitely a plan ahead of its time. The estimate for this
bridge was $1,500,000, roughly twice as much as Ellet’s proposal. Financial, and
railroad, support could not be secured and this proposal failed when only a very small
amount of the $1,500,000 was raised.47
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The same year Dent submitted his plan, men associated with the Pacific Railroad
of Missouri, as well as several men from southern Illinois who felt that their business
loyalties and prospects would fare better with Saint Louis than Chicago, formed the Saint
Louis and Illinois Bridge Company. Bridging the Mississippi River, so that railroad
traffic, and goods, could arrive and depart Saint Louis without the use of the ferry system,
was a major concern to these men. Organized with good intentions, the Saint Louis and
Illinois Bridge Company did not make an immediate impact on bridging the Mississippi
River and languished for close to a decade. The next proposal, in 1856, came from John
Roebling, not a household name yet but quickly on his way to becoming a respected
bridge designer and engineer. Roebling submitted a proposal for a suspension bridge
which was not accepted by the city. Two years later Roebling revised his design and
submitted several variations to the city in hopes of building the first bridge across the
Mississippi River at Saint Louis. None of his designs were accepted. If a Roebling
design had been accepted, we might have a suspension bridge in Saint Louis built by one
of the premier builders of suspension bridges of the nineteenth century. Instead we have a
unique iron and steel arch bridge, built by one of the premier self-taught engineers of all
time. Possible safety concerns of both Roebling’s and Ellet’s proposals, the most
promising engineers of the day, were reasons they may not have been accepted.48
As the years passed, Saint Louis city officials and civic leaders realized that a
bridge needed to be built. Railroads were building more roads towards Saint Louis and
unless a bridge was constructed railroads could decide to route their roads away from
Saint Louis, and adversely affect the economy of Saint Louis for years to come.
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Individuals also wanted a bridge that allowed them easy access across the river at all
times of the year, and in any kind of weather. As talking and planning for a bridge at
Saint Louis dragged on, the Civil War began and intruded on the plans for a bridge at
Saint Louis. The Civil War pushed bridge development back partly because of major
destruction of railroads in Missouri during the war. No action was taken between the time
Roebling submitted plans for a bridge at Saint Louis in 1856 and 1864. In early 1864,
Missouri state senator Norman Cutter sponsored legislation to authorize a new
organization with the original Saint Louis and Illinois Bridge Company name. This was
passed by the Missouri legislature. Although the original company appeared to be
dormant, and the legislation seemed to nullify any previous bridge charter, many people
in Saint Louis believed the original company created in 1855 might still be legitimate.
After gaining approval from Missouri in early 1864, Cutter waited until January 1865 to
attempt to gain approval to perform business in Illinois: specifically bridge building
business. With no action from Cutter between February 1864 and January 1865, it was
thought Cutter was positioning himself to sell the rights to build a bridge at Saint Louis to
the highest bidder.49
On February 7, 1865, Saint Louis city officials selected Truman Homer, the city
engineer, to evaluate possible bridge scenarios and develop a plan for a bridge that served
the residents, the railroads, and the needs of the city. Four days after receiving the request
from the city council for plans for a bridge, Homer provided a report to the city council.
This report was more feasible than some of the previous proposals. The plan Homer
submitted referenced a memo he received from the Common Council of the City of Saint
Louis on February 7, 1865. This memo stated a bridge was needed at Saint Louis for
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citizens and “. . . the great railroad traffic now centering in this city. . . .” In his report
Homer recommended a tubular type bridge with three spans of 500 feet each. His bridge
would only be approximately twenty-two feet above high water. He justified this height
because he knew steamboats could have their chimneys built in a fashion that allowed
them to be raised and lowered at will. Homer estimated the cost of his bridge to be
$3,332,200. With every proposal the cost of the bridge increased.50
Homer’s plan was prepared well but was not accepted by the city, just as the
others were not. The major difference between the Homer plan, and all previous plans,
was that Homer did not want a suspension bridge to be built. He was strongly opposed to
suspension bridges. One reason for Truman Homer stipulating the bridge at Saint Louis
should not be a suspension bridge may have been partially due to the need for this bridge
to carry rail traffic. The statistical information on bridge failures, and collapses, would be
difficult and time consuming for Homer to acquire, but as an engineer, although not a
bridge engineer, he would be more likely to obtain and keep track of this type of
information than the average citizen. Living in a large city like Saint Louis, Homer had
the luxury of the telegraph, couriers, the postal service, fellow engineers, and newspapers
to keep him informed of news concerning bridge issues. These statistics would have
supported Truman Homer’s dislike of suspension bridges. Armed with this information
Homer would have been justified in opposing a suspension bridge at Saint Louis. This
could have been the turning point for why there is no suspension bridge at Saint Louis.
Roebling submitted another proposal for a bridge at Saint Louis after Homer’s report,
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although it, like the first, was not selected. Why were Roebling’s designs rejected when
he had years of practical experience building bridges, specifically suspension bridges?
Many people in the early nineteenth century believed suspension bridges were unsafe.
Many more believed a railroad suspension bridge was not only unsafe, but a recipe for
disaster. These two reasons alone would have justified Roebling’s designs not being
selected. It is possible that minds in Saint Louis were made up and marching toward an
act of congress that forbid a suspension bridge at Saint Louis.51
Even as Truman Homer was creating his plans for a bridge, work was being
performed in the background by Cutter to secure the appropriate approvals to construct a
bridge. Since Cutter had already created a new bridge company and secured a charter
from the state of Missouri to build a bridge Cutter began the process of obtaining a
charter from the state of Illinois. Cutter had more difficulty receiving a charter from the
state of Illinois. By the time approval was being sought from the state of Illinois, several
groups, with reasons not to have a bridge built, had realized that a bridge was going to be
a major threat to their business interests. The Wiggins Ferry Company, various steamboat
and railroad companies, and quite possibly a group of business executives from Chicago
began putting up obstacles to a bridge being built at Saint Louis. It was not physical
obstacles but political obstacles that the eventual builder of the first bridge at Saint Louis
had to overcome.52
James B. Eads, the engineer who would eventually build the first railway bridge
to span the Mississippi River at Saint Louis, believed the ferry and transfer companies
were involved in attempts to block a bridge. In his June 1, 1868 report to the president
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and directors of the Illinois and St. Louis Bridge Company, Eads made it clear that he
believed the ferry and transfer companies had conspired figuratively to place roadblocks
in the path of the bridge. It is quite believable that the Wiggins Ferry Company attempted
to stop any bridge being erected at Saint Louis. An annual statement from the Wiggins
Ferry Company dated April 30, 1875, contains a note stating their concern for competing
with, as they called it “. . . the Bridge.” Even though it is clear, by the date, that any
battles to stop construction of the Eads Bridge had failed, the Wiggins Ferry Company’s
fear of competition with the bridge remained. The note attempted to assure that the
Wiggins Ferry Company, and two other transfer companies, are “. . . all three competitive
against the Bridge.” First and foremost in another note are concerns about how “. . . the
Bridge . . .” will affect business: “What effect the Bridge will have on the Ferry Co. as far
as Ferrying receipts are concerned no man can tell at present.” Clearly there was concern
that the Eads Bridge could, and probably would, severely damage the Wiggins Ferry
business. These two notes give weight to Eads’ argument that the Wiggins Ferry
company had tried to block construction of his bridge.53
The rejection of the Homer plan did not slow the Cutter group. After receiving
approval from Missouri and Illinois, Cutter sought approval from Congress via
legislation. During the planning phase for the bridge at Saint Louis, members of the
Cutter faction convinced Missouri Senator B. Gratz Brown to introduce, on February 15,
1866, Senate Bill 38. This bill stated, among other things, that the bridge at Saint Louis
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could be built as a drawbridge or with unbroken or continuous spans. When B. Gratz
Brown introduced his bill for the bridge to be built at Saint Louis he wanted a bridge that
would be strong, permanent, and considered a work of art.54 As progress towards bridge
construction continued to move forward steamboat interests in Saint Louis became
increasingly concerned. They knew they had eventually to coexist with bridges and began
making plans to retain as much power as they could. Because of this, the Saint Louis
Merchants Exchange created a committee to study steamboat concerns and produce a
document to be submitted to Congress that addressed issues concerning bridge
construction. The steamboat interests did not know that the man appointed as chairman,
James B. Eads, would be putting up river obstacles of his own in the near future. As
chairman of this committee Eads retained his lifelong interest in clear river navigation.
He also had several business interests he attended to. One of these was involvement in
railroads. Any legislation to be passed could greatly affect Eads business interests. The
immediate outcome of this Eads-led committee were several restrictions “to be placed in
any congressional legislation by the Missouri delegation.” Two of these restrictions dealt
specifically with types of bridges that could not be built. Drawbridges were to be banned
as well as suspension bridges. The integrity of suspension bridges was questionable and
their banning was an understandable reaction when suspension bridges had often failed.55
As of March 20, 1866, major amendments for Senate Bill 38, including the
restrictions from the Eads-led committee, had been submitted to Congress by B. Gratz
Brown. In little more than a month these amendments stipulated that a suspension bridge
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was an invalid option, the minimum lengths of the spans had increased dramatically, and
the span over the main steamboat channel “. . . shall be fifty-feet above the city directrix,
measured to the lowest part of the bridge at the centre of the span.” The amended bill
required the spans to be no less than 500 feet, but did not allow a suspension bridge to be
built. It is interesting that suspension bridges were banned as they were beginning to be
constructed in a much safer manner, especially by Roebling. Suspension bridges had
already been built with greater spans and therefore a minimum span of 500 feet could
easily have been constructed. This reworked bill contained wording that made it appear
impossible to build any type of bridge at Saint Louis. The specifications in the amended
bill were met with suspicion and resistance. However, these issues were eventually
reconciled and President Andrew Johnson signed the Senate bill into law on July 25,
1866. This bill authorized bridge construction across the Mississippi River at various
points, including Saint Louis. The wording referencing the height of the bridge at the
center seemed to tie back to Eads design of the bridge being an arch bridge. Brown was
not only instrumental in getting Senate Bill 38 signed into law, after leaving office he
also supplied a great deal of granite used to build the bridge.56
It has been stated that many did not believe there was anyone with the knowledge,
and ability, to build a 500 foot non-suspension span at the time the bill was passed.57 If
so, then why put these stipulations in the bill? Who was so afraid of having a bridge built
across the Mississippi River at Saint Louis that they possibly got Congress to approve a
clause in the bill authorizing a bridge, but that the bridge could not be a suspension
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bridge, and that its spans could not be less than 500 feet? Was it the Wiggins Ferry
Company? The Wiggins, and other ferry and transfer companies, would have supported
these, and any other, stipulations they felt could prevent a bridge from being built. This
made them prime suspects for twisting the arms of legislators to have the bill written a
certain way. They had a substantial investment in their ferry company and would not
want to lose it. Since the Wheeling Suspension Bridge was complete, and the Roebling
Suspension Bridge almost complete, the Wiggins Ferry company would have had the
foresight to realize a suspension bridge could be built across the Mississippi River.
Therefore it was only a matter of time before a bridge at Saint Louis began cutting into
their business. If the Wiggins Ferry company did get this “no suspension bridge” clause
into the bill, were they assuming the bridge to be built would be a truss or arch bridge?
Either of these bridge types would require more river piers than a suspension bridge.
These piers would be considered obstructions, making a truss or arch bridge design
approval less likely.58
It could also have been supporters of the Saint Louis-backed bridge building
company who had these stipulations inserted in the bill. They could have believed, or
been told, that a non-suspension bridge with 500 foot spans was possible, especially since
one had already been built in Holland. The Kuilenburg Bridge was built on the river Leek
in Holland in 1866 and had a single 515 foot span. This bridge was built one and a half to
two years before the Eads Bridge was started. It is possible that Eads knew of the
construction of this bridge and supported the stipulation that the spans of the bridge at
Saint Louis could be no less than 500 feet, knowing that he was able to build spans this

58

Jackson, Rails across the Mississippi, 57; Miller and Scott, The Eads Bridge, 80; Woodward, A History
of the St. Louis Bridge, 12-13.

Timmerman, Kurt, 2014, UMSL, p.38
long when others might not believe it was possible. This could have been a ploy to get the
ferry and transfer companies to agree to this legislation and remove them as obstacles.59
The Eads Bridge was built to serve a practical purpose. It was built with the
expectation that it would bring prosperity and relief to the city of Saint Louis and its
citizens. Saint Louis had realized the need for a bridge for many years but it was not until
the construction of the Rock Island Bridge that the leaders of Saint Louis determined that
the economic well-being of the city depended on constructing a bridge across the
Mississippi River at Saint Louis. With the increasing number of railroads being built in
the United States the bridge needed to be a railroad bridge at a minimum, but the
necessity for pedestrian and wagon traffic was also a priority.
How did Saint Louis end up with an arch bridge spanning the Mississippi River
and not a different type of bridge? There were several bridge builders with the experience
and ability to span the Mississippi River that Saint Louis city leaders could have chosen.
Considering that James Eads had no experience building bridges it seemed to be a great
risk to select Eads as the individual to design and build the bridge across the Mississippi
River at Saint Louis. At the time of the planning and construction of the Eads Bridge
technology existed to build a safe, sustainable, railway and roadway suspension bridge
across the Mississippi River at Saint Louis. This technology had been proven for many
years prior to the planning of the Eads Bridge.
Leading up to the construction of the Eads Bridge three of the most capable
United States engineers of the early to late-nineteenth century; Charles Ellet, Jr., John A.
Roebling, and James B. Eads, each had attempted to become the builder of the first
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bridge across the Mississippi River at Saint Louis. Ellet and Roebling were two of the
greatest United States bridge engineers. Eads, although not a bridge engineer, was one of
the greatest United States engineers. It is quite conceivable that people standing on the
Saint Louis riverfront today looking at the first bridge to span the Mississippi River at
Saint Louis could be looking at a suspension bridge. If that were the case, it would be the
third oldest working suspension bridge in the United States, behind the Wheeling
Suspension Bridge at Wheeling, West Virginia, and the Roebling Suspension Bridge at
Cincinnati, Ohio.
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Chapter 2
A Saint Louis Solution
It was the self-taught engineer, James B. Eads, who was successful in building the
first bridge across the Mississippi River at Saint Louis. Eads, who had no formal
engineering education or experience building bridges, was counted on to bridge the
Mississippi River at Saint Louis in order to bring the railroad, and hopefully prosperity,
into Saint Louis from the east. A good argument for selecting Eads to build the bridge
across the Mississippi River was because of his many talents over a wide range of areas.
His accomplishments as a river salvager and Civil War gunboat builder were widely
known in Saint Louis. His background as a self-starter, who often needed to devise
technical solutions on short notice as well as obtain financing for his projects, gave his
supporters confidence he would complete his projects. The ability to acquire the money
needed to get the bridge built was an important reason that the leading men in Saint Louis
supported Eads. This support was orchestrated by Eads himself when he decided to take
control of the Saint Louis and Illinois Bridge Company to keep the construction of the
bridge out of the hands of individuals wishing to deny Saint Louis a bridge and
subsequent economic growth. Eads handpicked the men he wanted on his team to get his
bridge built. He shared his designs with these men to garner their support. This was a
relationship that benefited both Eads and his backers. His backers knew Eads had the
technical ability to build his bridge but more importantly they knew their financial
investment was safe with him. Eads was a shrewd and experienced businessman who
knew how to convince investors that his projects were worth their investments. Even with
Eads’ expertise in acquiring funding, financial resources in America and Europe were not
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interested in funding the construction of the bridge until certain amendments were made
to the Illinois charter.60
Once the amended Senate Bill 38 had been signed into law, Missouri Senator
Norman Cutter, who had created the second charter for the Saint Louis and Illinois
Bridge Company in 1864, began acquiring financial backing and engaging bridge
building companies interested in financing and constructing the bridge. At about this
time, Lucius B. Boomer, a bridge builder from Chicago, attempted to secure the rights
from Cutter, to build the bridge at Saint Louis. There were many in Saint Louis who
believed Boomer was trying to gain control of the building of the bridge to delay or stop
construction of the bridge at Saint Louis to benefit Chicago. Before Boomer was able to
secure the contract to build the bridge, financing had to be in place. This required that
changes be made to the Illinois charter to appease investors. Boomer wanted the contract
so he promised his support in getting changes made to the charter.
Once word was received in Saint Louis that Cutter and Boomer were working
together to get amendments made to the Illinois charter, the concern in Saint Louis
ballooned. A meeting was held on February 17, 1867, in the Southern Hotel, and Eads
was appointed chief engineer. In an effort to build confidence in his abilities and design,
and to thwart any possible attempt to replace him, Eads assembled a group of
accomplished engineers with bridge building experience. As chief engineer, Eads was
ultimately responsible for the bridge but relied heavily on these engineers for all aspects
of successful completion of his bridge. One of the most important areas these engineers
were involved in was the testing of the components and materials to be used in the
bridge. Henry Flad, Eads’ chief assistant engineer, developed a machine to be used to test
60
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materials to an extremely precise tolerance. Eads established guidelines for all materials
to be tested. Those that did not pass all tests required were rejected. These engineers did
not disappoint Eads and were an integral part of his success. The collection of selected
engineers, along with Eads engineering intelligence, political, and financial influence,
insured the completion of his bridge over the Mississippi River.61
Eads was convinced that the people of Saint Louis realized the importance of a
bridge at Saint Louis and began working on a plan to keep the construction of the bridge
from falling into the hands of what were perceived as Chicago interests. While Eads
worked on his plan, Boomer felt that now that he had an exclusive charter from Illinois to
build a bridge the Saint Louis group would no longer pursue a bridge. This did not
happen as Boomer found that support for the Saint Louis group grew because people
believed Boomer had nefarious intentions. Boomer attempted several strategies to
discredit the Saint Louis group’s construction plan, but was not able to gather enough
support to stop them. Every time Boomer presented a flaw with the Saint Louis and
Illinois Bridge Company plan, Eads addressed and rebutted any accusation put forth by
the Boomer group. As both groups realized continued agitation between them resulted in
no bridge, discussions were held between the groups to attempt to resolve differences, but
to no avail. Eventually the two companies were able to agree to a consolidation with the
remaining company being named the Illinois and St. Louis Bridge Company, adopting
the plans developed by the Saint Louis and Illinois Bridge Company, naming Eads the
chief engineer, and paying off Boomer. Once this consolidation was finalized
construction proceeded with no fear of another bridge company interfering.
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Although there were several factions who did not want a suspension bridge built
at Saint Louis it is entirely possible that the Eads Bridge is not a suspension bridge
because of Eads himself. In his book, James B Eads, Louis How, Eads’ grandson, made it
clear that Eads was very exacting, knowledgeable, and driven. He was also tactically
forceful and demanding when the situation required such action. How demonstrated this
trait when he stated, “His wide and thin-lipped mouth shut so emphatically that it made it
plain his intention to do, in spite of all, what he believed could and should be done.”
Describing Eads forcefulness, How gives us the following: “Some one said that it was a
hundred horse-power mouth. It admitted no trifling. When it spoke seriously, it spoke
finally.” Reading the letters written by Eads to the editor of an engineering magazine,
confronting and rebutting Washington Roebling’s comments of Eads Bridge and some of
the components of his bridge, give a good example of the determination Eads possessed.
At the formal opening of his Bridge on July 4, 1874, Eads continued to display
confidence in his abilities when, in his address to those gathered that day, he stated that
he had experienced no respite from worry when the piers reached bedrock, or when the
first heavy locomotives were driven over the finished bridge, for he: “. . . had felt no
anxiety on the subject.”62
Another example of Eads self-assurance is recorded in the diary of the engineer in
charge of the work on the west abutment. When referring to some machinery that he
believed needed correction, but that Eads believed was just fine, Benjamin Singleton
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wrote that: “. . . his obstinacy knows no bounds. He will have his own way at whatever
cost.”63
As demonstrated in the following quote from his report to the president and
directors of the Illinois and St. Louis Bridge Company, Eads was very confident in his
abilities: “Must we admit that because a thing has never been done, it never can be, when
our knowledge and judgment assure us that it is entirely practicable?” Clearly Eads had
the personality and confidence, if not the formal technical training, to get his bridge built.
As part of the amendments to Senate Bill 38 Eads’ committee also specified lengths of
spans to be built. Is it possible Eads was planning to build his own bridge and wanted to
make sure it was of a type only he could construct and therefore have no competition?
Eads later disclosed that he persuaded the Saint Louis Merchants Exchange Committee to
advocate very long spans. Because of these long spans a truss bridge was impracticable,
but Eads was confident he could build arch spans of these lengths. Although these
opinions by a self-taught engineer who had never built a bridge before seemed
questionable, it must be remembered that Eads accomplishments to this point in his life
were vast and bold. His self-assurance and driven attitude had allowed him to accomplish
much. Because of the unprecedented demands required by Senate Bill 38, of any bridge
to be built at Saint Louis, it was believed there was no engineer in the United States with
the ability and experience to build this bridge.64
This was clearly incorrect but exactly what Eads would have wanted all to
believe. Several bridges, though not arch bridges, had been built in the United States that
easily surpassed the 500 foot span length requirement. The Niagara Falls Suspension
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Bridge had a span of 825 feet; the Wheeling Suspension Bridge had a span of 1010 feet,
and the Roebling Suspension Bridge had a span of 1057 feet. The construction of these
three bridges had begun before 1857; eight to nine years before the bill in Congress
stipulated the span length of the bridge at Saint Louis. Any of the builders of these three
bridges could easily have built a bridge across the Mississippi River at Saint Louis with a
center span of 500 feet. Considering the suspension bridges these builders had already
built it seems likely that the center span would be much longer than the bill required,
possibly reaching 1,000 feet or more. This would leave steamboats plenty of room for
maneuvering around other steamboats and any piers in the river. The physical restrictions
imposed for the building of the bridge at Saint Louis were not the only obstacles to be
overcome for successful construction of the bridge. In addition, political and financial
hurdles had to be surmounted to move forward with the bridge at Saint Louis.
The opposition by steamboat interests to railroads and bridges spanning rivers
was not unique to Saint Louis as it began its process to acquire a bridge across the
Mississippi River. Steamboat interests in the east realized, years earlier, that bridging the
Ohio River for the railroads terminating at the river created problems for themselves. The
construction of a bridge over the Ohio River brought several problems home to the
steamboat operators. Although these operators felt assured that Congress would require
the bridge builders leave the river navigable, there was no protection from Congress for
passengers and freight lured to the railroad and bridge for faster and cheaper transit over
the river.65
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One of the major obstacles cited by steamboat operators was that the bridges did
not provide enough clearance for their smokestacks to pass under them. Even though the
steamboats were, or could have been, equipped with the machinery necessary to lower
the smokestacks to pass under a bridge, the steamboat operators claimed this was a
difficult and dangerous task. They wanted to see the bridges raised or removed to
accommodate their smokestacks. Taller smokestacks were part of an attempt by
steamboat builders to make their engines more efficient, by increasing the furnace draft,
and therefore less costly. This method was known as the natural draft method. There was
another method, the artificial draft method, which used fan blowers and steam jets to
increase draft and therefore improved the engine efficiency. This method did not require
the tall heavy smokestacks and consequently removed the need to have excessive
clearance from water level to bridge. This artificial method was in use by 1850 and if it
had been incorporated by all, or most, steamboats it would have eliminated the argument
that there was not enough clearance for the steamboat smokestack. This would have
weakened the steamboat interests’ position against any bridge planned or already under
construction.66
There was a suggestion that a truss bridge be built at Saint Louis. This was
dismissed when Eads determined that; “Steel trusses 500 feet long would have to be
made extremely heavy….” Eads believed that he could build a steel arch 500 feet long
that was just as strong, but lighter and therefore much cheaper. Eads believed that arches
were the most cost effective construction method for the bridge at Saint Louis, “. . . the
plan adopted for the construction of this Bridge, instead of being needlessly expensive, is
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really the most economical of all known methods.”67 Eads was adamant his arch bridge
design was the only design capable of providing the strength and stability needed to span
the Mississippi River for rail traffic. In addition to providing the solidity needed Eads
selected his arch design over all others for its timeless beauty acquired at a cost-effective
price.68
On this point Eads was possibly wrong, as suspension bridges had proven to be
very economical, then again Eads gave a very persuasive argument that his arch bridge
could be cheaper than a suspension bridge. In his Report to The President and Directors
of the Illinois and St. Louis Bridge Company in 1868, Eads went into great detail to
explain and justify why he picked an arch over a suspension bridge for the bridge at Saint
Louis. He explained that cast iron had an elastic strength of about 7,000 pounds per
square inch before a permanent set occurred, and wrought iron had an elastic strength of
18,000 to 25,000 pounds per inch before permanent set. If a permanent set did not occur
the metal would resume its normal shape and elasticity. The elasticity and permanent set
properties were the keys to his selection of an arch bridge. The forces exerted on the arch
bridge are compressive in nature whereas on a suspension bridge they are tensile. When
cast iron wires are exposed to tension, as in a suspension bridge, they are stretched and
narrowed. If the tension is within the elastic limits the wires will resume their normal
shape and strength. If the tension exceeds the elastic limits the wires will receive a
permanent set and remain stretched, narrowed, and weakened with internal defects. Once
this occurs subsequent tension of these wires can cause catastrophic failure. When cast
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iron is exposed to compression, as in an arch bridge, it is compressed and expands in
diameter. If the compression is great enough to cause a permanent set to occur the cast
iron will undergo a physical change, but it will be in the form of expansion in diameter,
the opposite of a permanent set from tension. Because of this the structural integrity of
the arch bridge, although weakened, is maintained at a higher level of safety than is the
suspension bridge that undergoes an event of tension that effects a permanent set on its
suspension wires. Eads pointed out that he had no evidence “. . . that iron or steel, when
under compression, are anymore liable to fracture by sudden jarring than when at rest; or
that their strength is at all impaired by vibration when under compression.” The same
could not be said for iron or steel when under tension, as in a suspension bridge. When
under tension, iron or steel are more likely to incur damage such as fracturing, and loss of
strength when they are subject to conditions such as sudden jarring, concussion, and
vibration. Because of this Eads presented a guideline for engineers to follow when using
cast iron and or cast steel. When using these metals for tension the engineers should: “. . .
leave a large margin within the elastic limit for safety but for compressive strains he may
base his calculations on using them to the full limit of elasticity with entire safety.”69
This was a key point in Eads argument that the total cost of his upright arch could
be much less than a suspended arch. To obtain the maximum strength of an upright arch,
such as Eads designed, steel in compression needed to be used. Eads was able to present
to the president and directors of the Illinois and St. Louis Bridge Company the results of
testing performed on various forms of steel. All tests showed the strength of steel
improved, in both compression and tension environments, when worked by different
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methods. These tests showed the elastic limit of cast steel was greater in compression
than in tension.
After Eads presented these findings concerning testing using cast iron and cast
steel, he proceeded to inform his audience of the results of his investigation into the
viability of an upright arch. To determine the viability of the upright arch Eads sought the
answers to two key questions: “. . . will the structure require more material by using the
upright arch than the suspended one: and if so, how much more?” and “. . . will its
construction and erection be more costly?”70
Eads presented an example, based on testing of cast steel in a compression and
tension environment, as they related to an upright and suspended arch bridge. Even
though his testing showed cast steel in an upright arch possessed nearly twice the strength
as in the suspended arch, Eads example is presented with steel in an upright arch only
being fifty-percent stronger than the suspended arch. In his example, Eads presented,
based on testing, that “. . . an upright arch having 1,000 tons of cast steel properly
disposed throughout its length, would sustain as great a load as 1,500 tons in the
suspended form.” Eads conceded that more bracing was needed in the upright arch than
in the suspended arch to make the arch stable. Using his test results he felt he had an
excess of 500 tons between the abutments for his upright arch, which he could use some,
but not all, for bracing, compared to the steel in the suspended arch between the towers.
Eads did not count the additional steel required in the suspended arch from the towers to
the anchorages in this example. Eads believed the construction of the upright arch was
more expensive than the construction of the suspended arch but countered this with the
statement: “The greater cost of the erection of the upright arch could not possibly equal
70
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the cost of the greater quantity of material required in the suspended one between the
towers.”71 Eads also expanded on the excess of steel required beyond the towers by
stating that he believed the material running from anchorage to anchorage is: “. . . usually
double the length of the suspended arch . . . .” Because of this additional material
required from tower to anchorage, Eads calculated that since steel in tension is half the
strength of steel in compression, four times as much material is required in the suspended
arch as in the upright arch. Eads goes one step further in proving his point that the upright
arch was still cheaper to use than the suspended arch, even if steel did not have any
strength advantage in compression as opposed to tension. He stated that the excess
material required from the tower to the anchorage allowed him to build an upright arch,
correctly braced, for less than a suspended arch.
Eads also argued that there was a cost savings in the masonry required for an
upright arch as opposed to a suspended arch bridge. Eads stated that an upright arch had a
downward thrust on the abutments that was roughly equal to the pulling strain on the
anchorages. If the masonry required for the abutments was equal to the mass required for
the anchorages, based on Eads suppositions, then the masonry in the towers to support the
cables will be: “. . . that much more than the upright arch requires.” Eads was quite
confident in stating: “. . . all these facts clearly prove the economy of the upright ribbed
arch over every other system of bridging with long spans.”
After his presentation to validate his conviction for proclaiming his upright arch
as being cheaper than a suspended arch, Eads disclosed the main reason why this was
true:
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The chief secret of the greater economy of iron suspension bridges rests in
the fact that the limit of elasticity of iron wire is far greater in tension than
the limit of elasticity for any form of iron known (except steel) when used
in compression.72
Until steel was readily available for bridge construction iron wire suspension
bridges were the most economical bridges. The use of cast steel flipped this advantage
completely around and allowed upright arch bridges to be constructed cheaper, in
comparable or greater lengths, and with equal safety as suspension bridges. Eads was
able, through the use of illustrations and a layman type presentation, to describe how his
upright arch could compete with the suspended arch when cast steel was used.73
With his great knowledge of the Mississippi River currents, ice flows, scouring,
and depth to bedrock it is logical to question Eads decision to ignore the benefits of a
long-span railway suspension bridge for Saint Louis. A span of 800 feet or more in 1868
was easily obtainable as an 825 foot span over the Niagara River had been successfully
constructed thirteen years earlier. A long-span suspension bridge would have at most two
piers in the Mississippi River, as does the Eads Bridge, but with more river clearance
between them and possibly eliminating the shore abutments, completely negating
additional water work for the abutments. With a long-span suspension bridge it was
possible Eads could have placed his river piers in shallower water, or on land, thereby
reducing death and injury from caissons disease. A long-span suspension bridge would
have allowed more room side to side for boats to pass each other and would have
reduced, or eliminated, any ice dams caused by piers being placed close to each other. In
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addition, less masonry in the river would have reduced the cost of the bridge. Eads knew
this and also knew that because of its power, the Mississippi River could perform
disastrous work on man-made structures. This required him to build his piers on a scale
large enough to resist the force of the Mississippi River. To do this his piers required
massive amounts of masonry at great expense. One way to lower the cost of his bridge
would have been to have longer spans and thus require fewer piers or abutments and their
accompanying high costs.74
Eads was aware the success of the Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge proved the
feasibility of such a structure at Saint Louis. In his report to the principals of the St. Louis
Bridge Eads showed no bias against suspension bridges, only presenting facts and results
from his testing that supported his upright arch choice, when making his case for railway
traffic and common traffic sharing the same bridge at the same time, albeit on separate
levels. The ability to accommodate both means of traffic was entirely possible and had
already been proven. Several examples of these bridges in operation existed in Europe
and the United States, including the Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge. Included in Eads
report, while referring to both the upright and suspended arch bridges changing shape due
to a moving load, was an interesting quote from Eads. He acknowledged the suspension
bridge could be used for railway traffic when he stated: “For railroad purposes, however,
this could not be permitted in the suspended arch to any considerable extent.” Coming
from a man with Eads’ reputation and personality this statement is as close as you can get
to an endorsement by Eads for a railway suspension bridge, without being a direct
endorsement.75
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In addition to Eads, Ellet had made comments and statements that implied railway
suspension bridges were a valid and growing bridge type. Although not specifically
designed as a railway bridge, Ellet appeared to suggest that one day in the near future his
Wheeling Suspension Bridge would need to be refitted to handle rail traffic. Several
railroads considered Wheeling the ideal location to connect east-west rail traffic. Because
of this Ellet believed rail traffic would increase so much in the vicinity of the Wheeling
Suspension Bridge as to require access to his bridge. This would require upgrades to the
bridge to allow passage of rail traffic.76
Ellet’s apparent lack of concern with the fact that the bridge might need to handle
rail traffic in the near future implied he felt his suspension bridge could safely handle rail
traffic with minimal modifications. When the original Wheeling Suspension Bridge was
ravaged by high winds in 1854, this gave Ellet the opportunity to express his thoughts, to
his wife in a letter, on rebuilding the bridge as a railroad bridge: “. . . the probability is
that we shall soon enlarge the plan and convert the structure into a railroad bridge.” It is
obvious that Ellet’s plan to rebuild his bridge with an emphasis on rail traffic gave him no
pause for concern. Ellet also contacted railroads that were developing plans for
terminating at Wheeling, and presented them with proposals for acquiring access to his
bridge.77
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This action made it clear that Ellet felt his rebuilt bridge would be strong enough
to handle rail traffic. This confidence in his bridge to handle rail traffic was presented by
Ellet in 1854, twelve years before Eads began construction in Saint Louis. Although Ellet
did rebuild his bridge he did not, for various reasons, rebuild it to handle rail traffic.
Because of the topography at the selected bridge site in Saint Louis, a suspension
bridge would not appear to have any higher clearance than the highest point of the Eads
Bridge, but it would have this same clearance for the complete main span since it would
be unencumbered by the downward slope of an arch as it neared the piers. A unique
aspect of the proximity of a bridge to downtown Saint Louis worked in the favor of a
suspension bridge. A major complaint, by detractors, of the Niagara Falls Suspension
Bridge was the slow speed the trains used when crossing it. Because the bridge at Saint
Louis would have been located at the doorstep of downtown, a tunnel was required to
allow the train to pass under downtown without disrupting the functions of the city. Eads
stated that the tunnel, as of 1868: “. . . has been designed for the accommodation of a
single railroad track only . . . .” This restricted the number of trains that could use the
tunnel and was a limiting factor in the speed of trains using the tunnel. Because the tunnel
was so close to the bridge trains traveling east and west slowed for the tunnel. This
caused the train to be traveling slowly for the bridge crossing, making speed over the
bridge a non-issue.78
In a report to the president and directors of the Illinois and St. Louis Bridge
Company in 1868, Eads personally confirmed that any piers placed in the river for his
bridge were a dangerous, but necessary, requirement. Eads knew from many years of
experience on and below the river that anything in the river, including bridge piers, was
78
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an obstruction. Placing piers in rivers, no matter their position, required river traffic to be
alert and navigate around them. The thrust of his presentation: an obstacle in the river is a
danger to navigation, has been true from the day man first navigated a log downstream
and will remain true until the rivers run dry. What Eads did not present to his audience
was that his bridge design placed these dangers closer to river navigators than necessary.
A suspension bridge design with a main span of just 825 feet, the same span length of the
Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge that was built in 1855 and still in operation thirteen
years later, would have given almost 300 more feet of river navigation clearance for the
all-important center span, with no lowering of the bridge as with an arch bridge. It may
have been possible to eliminate bridge piers in the river by building a suspension bridge.
In an apparent attempt to calm fears concerning these obstacles, Eads put forth, while
defending his selection of Washington Avenue as placement for his bridge, an argument
that since Washington Avenue approximately split the wharf roughly equally above and
below the bridge, that this was an excellent location for segregating the Mississippi River
traffic north and south of Saint Louis. Supposing that all river navigation adhered to Eads
suggestion, Eads could have placed as many piers in the Mississippi River as he desired
and they would not have been an obstacle and there would never have been any collisions
with his bridge piers. Common sense and a little time spent discussing this plan with
steamboat captains on the Saint Louis waterfront in 1868, would have eliminated this
idea and elicited more than a few unkind words for Mr. Eads. Eads’ Washington Avenue
location for his bridge may have been the correct location, but his plan for dealing with
bridge piers in the river, which would have been less of a problem with a suspension
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bridge, was little more than a calming suggestion for the president and directors of the
Illinois and St. Louis Bridge Company.79
In 1873, steamboat interests met and petitioned the Secretary of War to review the
Saint Louis bridge construction because they felt it presented serious obstruction, and
dangerous conditions to river navigation. The Secretary of War organized a board of
engineers to review the design and construction of the Saint Louis bridge. This board
found, after several days of reviews and hearings, that the Saint Louis bridge design was
flawed. The Board “…recommended building a 120 foot wide canal behind the east
abutment with a draw bridge over the canal to allow the easy passage of large boats.” The
Secretary of War approved the findings of the Board and the Boards report was
forwarded to the bridge company on October 15, 1873.80
It is doubtful that Eads was able to control his emotions when he received this
report with his bridge construction so far along, especially when he had complied with
the construction stipulations approved by Congress. He was concerned with any possible
changes being forced on him, but he was more concerned with this report and how it
might affect the finances of the bridge company. Eads feared that this report could
negatively “…affect their credit rating and their ability to raise capital to complete the
bridge.” To minimize the deleterious effects of this report Eads addressed each and every
issue raised by the Board, and provided a defense of all issues in a report he presented to
the Board. Despite providing a defensible report of his bridge, which Eads pointed out
was: “…built according to the dimensions listed in the charter of the Bridge Company
79
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and approved by the U.S. Congress” the Board, after reviewing Eads defense, stood
firm.81
In addition to this official report by the Board, one member of this Board, General
Kemble Warren, wrote his own opinion of the bridge situation. In his opinion Warren
made it clear that he felt a suspension bridge, in place of the arch bridge, would have
been a better choice for Saint Louis. While not using the term suspension, Warren lists
cheaper cost, little to no river obstructions, and proven design as advantages of the bridge
type he believed should have been selected. These are all characteristics of a suspension
bridge.82
Warren was Washington Roeblings brother-in-law and most likely knew of the
feud taking place between Eads and Roebling concerning the airlocks for the caissons of
the Eads and Brooklyn Bridge. Eads believed Roebling had copied his airlock design for
the Brooklyn Bridge without remuneration or crediting him for the design. It is not
known if this feud colored Warren’s opinion that Eads used various manipulations to get
his bridge design specifications approved by Congress, but it is obvious that Warren felt
Eads bypassed the cheaper, simpler and proven concept of a suspension bridge to build a
bridge of his own design. While neither Eads nor Warren was formally trained in bridge
building, Warren did possess a much greater degree of formal engineering education than
Eads. Warren was an intelligent individual and competent engineer with many years of
experience. He graduated from West Point second in his class with high marks. He spent
many years exploring and documenting the Mississippi River as a Topographical
Engineer. This was followed by many years exploring and documenting the western
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United States, often in perilous situations. At West Point he held the position of assistant
professor of mathematics, where he spent approximately eighteen months before being
ordered to take command of a New York regiment of Zouaves at the beginning of the
Civil War. During the Civil War, Warren participated in many battles and engineering
projects and always distinguished himself as a competent and successful, if cautious,
leader of men. After the war, Warren continued his engineering work for the Corp of
Engineers. This included supervising the construction of the first double deck
drawbridges over the Mississippi River at Rock Island in 1867, and participating in other
bridge building projects in the 1870’s. It is obvious, from his experience and education,
Warren was qualified to review and recommend in many aspects of engineering. Even
though Warren had impressive credentials, it is possible he was unable to remain
objective when considering Ead’s Bridge and the complaints from the steamboat
interests.83
Even with the report from a board of distinguished experienced engineers, and the
Secretary of War approval, Eads was not to be denied. Drawing on past experiences Eads
had access to President Ulysses S. Grant and wasted little time gaining an appointment
with him. Grant sided with Eads and suggested the Secretary of War find other items to
occupy his time. This ended any interference from the board of engineers organized by
the Secretary of War to review the Saint Louis Bridge, and allowed Eads to finish his
bridge.84
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Conclusion
The Wheeling Suspension Bridge was the longest suspension bridge in the United
States when it was completed in 1849. The main span was 1,010 feet long from tower to
tower. This bridge had no piers in the Ohio River because the length allowed them to be
placed on land. This span length would not completely cross the Mississippi River at
Saint Louis, but minimal side spans would complete the crossing of the Mississippi
River. Another early suspension bridge was the first Lewiston & Queenston Suspension
Bridge completed in 1851. This bridge, built by engineer W. Edward Serrell, had a deck
span of approximately 849 feet. Similar to the span length of the Niagara Falls
Suspension Bridge, this bridge proved the ability to span great distances was available.
This bridge was wrecked by wind in 1864. As has already been discussed, the first
successful railway suspension bridge in the world was the Niagara Falls Suspension
Bridge. This bridge, completed in 1855, was 825 feet long; not long enough to span the
Mississippi River, but at 825 feet provided more river clearance for steamboats than the
Eads Bridge.85
The Roebling Suspension Bridge at Cincinnati, completed in 1866, provided
proof that the technology existed to span most of the Mississippi River at Saint Louis
with a suspension bridge. The bridge at Cincinnati had a main span of 1056 feet, side
spans of 278 feet, and a total length of 2250 feet. The length of the bridge spanning the
Ohio River at Cincinnati is 1612 feet. The Eads Bridge at Saint Louis has three spans of
502, 520, and 502 feet, for a river spanning length of 1524 feet, well within the 1612 foot
length of the Roebling Suspension Bridge at Cincinnati. If the main span at Saint Louis
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was 1020 feet, quite feasible in 1868, this would leave side spans of 251 feet. This would
give tremendous river clearance, allowing steamboats to have approximately 170 feet
clearance as opposed to approximately 130 feet clearance between each boat with the
Eads Bridge, and possibly more height clearance as well. A 1020 foot main span at Saint
Louis would be conservative considering the Roebling Suspension Bridge at Cincinnati
had a main span of 1056 feet when it was completed in 1866. This would only be
approximately 200 feet longer than the Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge completed in
1855. Surely technology and techniques had advanced enough in the thirteen years
between completion of the Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge in 1855, to the start of
construction of the Eads Bridge in 1868, to support the additional 200 feet of suspension
bridge.
The Niagara Clifton Bridge, a suspension bridge with a span of 1,268 feet, was
designed by Samuel Keefer. Construction began in 1867 and was completed in 1869.
This suspension bridge was initially built of wood with wire cables. In 1872, the wooden
bottom chords, key components of many bridges, were replaced with steel. This bridge
served for many years before failing in a major storm in 1889, and falling into the river
below. This bridge would not span the Mississippi River, as others would not, but an
accumulation of education and knowledge was building for future long-span suspension
bridges.86 Using just the preceding five examples of suspension bridges built from 1849
to 1867, with ever increasing main spans, it is obvious that the ability to span the
Mississippi River at Saint Louis with a suspension bridge existed before Eads began
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construction. Three of these bridges were completed years before Eads became involved
in the considerations for a bridge at Saint Louis.
A suspension bridge should have been an easier sell to the steamboat interests
than the arch bridge Eads eventually completed in 1874. A suspension bridge should have
had fewer obstacles to river traffic, since it should have needed fewer piers in the river.
The height of the deck at the pier would be higher than the arch bridge as the arch would
need to curve down to meet the pier.
Eads deftly explained why technically, based on the elasticity of cast iron and cast
steel, an arch bridge was a better, and safer, option than a suspension bridge. In concert
with this technical explanation Eads also explained why financially his arch bridge was a
better choice. Although a suspension bridge would have been successful in place of the
Eads arch bridge, the arch bridge constructed by Eads, based on his design, explanations
and the all-important use of cast steel, was the correct and best choice of bridge type to
have been constructed.
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Appendix A

Generic illustration of a suspension bridge.
Kurt Timmerman, General illustration of a suspension bridge, 2014
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Appendix B

Example of Finley’s Jacob Creek Chain Link Suspension Bridge that
spanned Jacob Creek in 1801.
James Finley, “A Description of the Patent Chain Bridge,’ The Port Folio, 3no6 (1810):
441-453.
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Appendix C

Niagara Falls Railway Suspension Bridge Illustration, 1859.
Ralph Greenhill, Spanning Niagara: The International Bridges 1848-1962 (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1970), 29.
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Appendix D

Niagara Falls Railway Suspension Bridge Photograph with full size
train crossing bridge, 1859.
Ralph Greenhill, Spanning Niagara: The International Bridges 1848-1962 (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1970), 31.
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Appendix E

Niagara Falls Railway Suspension Bridge Photograph
William England, http://www.sanjeev.net/modernart/niagara-suspension-bridge-bywilliam-england-1691.html.
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Appendix F

Niagara Falls Railway Suspension Bridge Photograph
William England,
http://www.vintageworks.net/exhibit/full_image.php/71/1/0/0/21347/11796_Willi
am_England.jpg.
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Appendix G

Eads Bridge St. Louis Missouri, 2005.
Terry Turnbeaugh, 2005 Eads Bridge St. Louis Missouri, 2005,
http://www.nomadiksoul.com/nomadsplace/Gallery.html.
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Appendix H

Example of bar chain suspension bridge/Clifton Bar Chain Suspension
Bridge.
Example of bar chain suspension bridge/Clifton Bar Chain Suspension Bridge,
http://img.readtiger.com/wkp/en/Uk_bristol_csbchains.jpg .
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Appendix I

Example of cable suspension bridge/Wheeling Cable Suspension Bridge.
Example of cable suspension bridge/Wheeling Cable Suspension Bridge,
http://media.photobucket.com/user/paulthreestang/media/Cross%20Country%209
-1111/Sept112011Trip447.jpg.html?filters[term]=wheeling%20suspension%20bridg
e&filters[primary]=images&filters[secondary]=videos&sort=1&o=6.

Timmerman, Kurt, 2014, UMSL, p.71

Bibliography
Primary Sources
“Wire Rope Fastening.” Engineering V. 8 (1869): 319. Quoted in Kirti Gandhi. The St.
Louis Bridge, the Brooklyn Bridge, and the feud between Eads and Roebling,
Gandhi Consulting Engineers and Architects.
Adams, LL.D., Charles Kendall, ed. Johnson’s Universal Cyclopedia Vol 1. New York:
A. J. Johnson Company, 1893.
Blue Note. St. Louis, MO: Peugnet Collection 73-0068 Missouri Historical Society, ND.
Eads, James B. “Saint Louis Bridge. Report to the President and Directors of the Illinois
and St. Louis Bridge Company.” In Addresses and Papers of James B. Eads
together with a Biographical Sketch, edited by Estill McHenry, 511. St. Louis,
MO: Slawson & Co., Printers, 1884.
Ellet Jr, Charles. “Report on the Wheeling and Belmont Suspension Bridge, to the City
Council of Wheeling.” Philadelphia: John C. Clark 1847, 37. Quoted in Elizabeth
Monroe. The Wheeling Bridge Case. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press,
1992.
Finley, James. “A Description of the Patent Chain Bridge,” The Port Folio, 3no6 (1810):
441-453.
Fordham, G.F.. In The Irish Penny Journal 34 (1841): JSTOR, www.jstor.org.
Homer, Truman. Reports of the City Engineer and Special Committee to the Board of
Common Council of the City of St. Louis in relation to a Bridge Across The
Mississippi River At St. Louis. St. Louis, MO: M’kee Fishback and Company,
Printers and Binders, 1865.

Timmerman, Kurt, 2014, UMSL, p.72
House Report No. 135, 24th Cong., 2d Sess. (1837): 21-25. Quoted in Gene D. Lewis.
Charles Ellet, Jr. The Engineer as Individualist 1810-1862. Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press, 1968.
House Report No. 135, 24th Cong., 2d Sess. (1837), 21-25.
Longstaffe, William Hylton Dyer. The History and Antiquities of the Parish of
Darlington in the Bishoprick. Darlington, UK: The Proprietors of the Darlington
and Stockton Times, 1854.
New York State Library. “Gouverneur Kemble Warren Papers, 1848-1882.”
http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/msscfa/sc10668.htm.
Pairpoint, Alfred. Uncle Sam and His Country. London: Simpkin, Marshall & CO., 1857.
Roebling, John A. Final Report of John A. Roebling, Civil Engineer, to the Presidents
and Directors of the Niagara Falls Suspension and Niagara Falls International
Bridge Companies. Rochester, N.Y.: Steam Press of Lee, Mann, and CO., Daily
American, 1855.
Roebling, John A. Report of John A. Roebling, Civil Engineer, to the Presidents and
Directors of the Niagara Falls Suspension and Niagara Falls International
Bridge Companies on the condition of the Niagara Railway Suspension Bridge.
August 1, 1860. Trenton N.J.: Murphy & Bechtel, Printers, Opposite the City
Hall, 1860.
S. 38 39th Congress 1st Session http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=llsb&fileName=039/llsb039.db&recNum=208
S. 38 Amendment 39th Congress 1st Session http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=llsb&fileName=039/llsb039.db&recNum=219

Timmerman, Kurt, 2014, UMSL, p.73
Simpson, J. H., Warren, G. K., Weitzel, G., Merrill, W. E., Suter, C. R. “The St. Louis
Bridge an obstruction to navigation,” The Railroad Gazette, V. 5 October 25,
1873, 434-435. Quoted in Kirti Gandhi. The St. Louis Bridge, the Brooklyn
Bridge, and the feud between Eads and Roebling. Gandhi Consulting Engineers
and Architects.
Wiggins Annual Statement. Annual Statement of Wiggins Ferry Company ending April
30th 1875. St. Louis, MO: Peugnet Collection 73-0068 Missouri Historical
Society, 1875.
Woodward, C. M. A History of the St. Louis Bridge. St. Louis, MO: G.I. Jones and
Company, 1881.

Timmerman, Kurt, 2014, UMSL, p.74
Secondary Sources
American Locomotive Company. Growing with Schenectady: American Locomotive
Company. Schenectady, NY: American Locomotive Company, 1948.
Billington, David P. The Innovators: The Engineering Pioneers who made America
Modern. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996.
Billington, David P. The Tower and the Bridge: The New Art of Structural Engineering.
Princeton, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996.
Clifton Bar Chain Suspension Bridge,
http://img.readtiger.com/wkp/en/Uk_bristol_csbchains.jpg .
England, William. http://www.sanjeev.net/modernart/niagara-suspension-bridge-bywilliam-england-1691.html.
England, William.
http://www.vintageworks.net/exhibit/full_image.php/71/1/0/0/21347/11796_Willi
am_England.jpg.
Fowle, Frank F. “The Original Rock Island Bridge across the Mississippi River.” The
Railway and Locomotive Historical Society Bulletin, no. 56 (1941): 9
Gandhi, Ph.D., P.E., Kirti. “The St. Louis Bridge, the Brooklyn Bridge, and the feud
between Eads and Roebling.” Gandhi Consulting Engineers and Architects.
http://www.gandhieng.com/resources/MEDIA/St.%20Louis%20Bridge,%20the%
20Brooklyn%20Bridge,%20and%20the%20feud%20between%20Eads%20and%
20Roebling.pdf.
Greenhill, Ralph. Spanning Niagara: The International Bridges 1848-1962. Seattle and
London: The University of Washington Press, 1984.

Timmerman, Kurt, 2014, UMSL, p.75
Hopkins, H.J. A Span of Bridges: An Illustrated History. New York: Praeger Publishers,
1970.
How, Louis. James B. Eads. Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1900.
Jackson, Donald C. Great American Bridges and Dams. Washington, DC: The
Preservation Press, 1988.
Jackson, Robert W. Rails across the Mississippi: A History of the St. Louis Bridge.
Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2001.
Jordan, David M. Happiness is not my Companion: The Life of General G.K. Warren.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001.
Kawada, Tadaki. History of the Modern Suspension Bridge: Solving the Dilemna between
Economy and Stiffness. Translated by Harukazu Ohashi. Edited by Richard Scott.
Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, 2010.
Kemp, E. L. “Links in a chain: The development of suspension bridges 1801-70.” The
Structural Engineer, Volume 57A, no.8 (1979): 257-258.
Kemp, Emory. “Iron, Engineers, and the Wheeling Suspension Bridge.” Upper Ohio
Valley Historical Review 11 (Spring-Summer 1982): 2-11.
Kemp, Emory L. Charles Ellet, Jr. and the Wheeling Suspension Bridge. In Proceedings
of an International Conference on Historic Bridges to Celebrate the 150th
Anniversary of the Wheeling Suspension Bridge October 21-23, 1999 Wheeling
West Virginia, edited by Emory L. Kemp, 15-32. Morgantown, WV: West
Virginia University Press, 1999.
Kemp, Emory L. and Fluty, Beverly B. The Wheeling Suspension Bridge: A Pictorial
Heritage. Charleston, WV: Pictorial Histories Publishing Co., 1999.

Timmerman, Kurt, 2014, UMSL, p.76
Kirby, Maurice W. The Origins of Railway Enterprise: The Stockton and Darlington
Railway, 1821-1863. Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press,
1993.
Kouwenhoven, John. “The Designing of the Eads Bridge.” Technology and Culture 23
(Oct. 1982): 535-568.
Lewis, Gene D. Charles Ellet, Jr.: The Engineer as Individualist 1810-1862. Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press, 1968.
McCullough, David. The Great Bridge: The Epic Story of the Building of the Brooklyn
Bridge. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972.
Miller, Howard S. and Scott, Quinta. The Eads Bridge. St. Louis, MO: Missouri
Historical Society Press, 1979.
Monroe, Elizabeth Brand. The Wheeling Bridge Case. Boston, MA: Northeastern
University Press, 1992.
New York State Library. “Gouverneur Kemble Warren Papers, 1848-1882.”
http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/msscfa/sc10668.htm.
Peterson, Norma L. Freedom and Franchise: The Political Career of B. Gratz Brown.
Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1965.
Petroski, Henry. Engineers of Dreams. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995.
Primm, James Neal. Lion of the Valley. Boulder, CO: Pruett Publishing Company, 1981.
Roebling, John A. Papers. Special Collections of the Library of Rutgers University.
Quoted in David McCullough. The Greatest Bridge The Epic Story of the
Building of the Brooklyn Bridge. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972.
Steinman, David B. The Builders of the Bridge. New York: Arno Press, 1972.

Timmerman, Kurt, 2014, UMSL, p.77
Steinman, David B. and Watson, Sara Ruth. Bridges and their Builders. New York:
Dover Publications, Inc., 1941.
Taylor, George Rogers. The Transportation Revolution 1815-1860. Armonk, NY: M. E.
Sharpe, Inc., 1951.
Timmerman, Kurt. General illustration of a suspension bridge, 2014.
Trachtenberg, Alan. Brooklyn Bridge: Fact and Symbol. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1965.
Turnbeaugh, Terry. 2005 Eads Bridge St. Louis Missouri, 2005,
http://www.nomadiksoul.com/nomadsplace/Gallery.html.
Wheeling Cable Suspension Bridge,
http://media.photobucket.com/user/paulthreestang/media/Cross%20Country%209
-1111/Sept112011Trip447.jpg.html?filters[term]=wheeling%20suspension%20bridg
e&filters[primary]=images&filters[secondary]=videos&sort=1&o=6
White Jr., John H. Wet Britches and Muddy Boots: A History of Travel in Victorian
America. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013.

